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It is widely understood among scientists and criminal andcivil lawyers that eyewitnesses are often inaccurate, and thatinaccurate information can contaminate memories of other
eyewitnesses.1 It is less widely known—although no less
true—that when misleading claims are repeated, they are more
likely to damage other people’s memories than when those
claims are made only once.2 But until recently, neither lawyers
nor scientists knew the answer to these questions: Does one
person repeating an inaccurate claim do more damage to the
memories of other eyewitnesses than that same person making
the claim only once? And when that inaccurate claim is
repeated, does it matter how many people make it? In this
paper, we address those questions.
Suppose a robbery occurs for which there were four eyewit-
nesses. If one eyewitness, let’s call him John, mistakenly tells
another eyewitness, Ringo, that the robber was wearing a blue
hat—when in fact the robber was wearing a black hat—than
we know Ringo may, inadvertently, remember later that the
robber was wearing a blue hat. But would Ringo be even more
likely to make this mistake if John had repeated that inaccurate
claim multiple times? By contrast, suppose that all of the eye-
witnesses—John, Paul, and George—mistakenly claimed it
was a blue hat. Would their converging evidence be more mis-
leading to Ringo than if John had simply repeated it multiple
times? Put another way, do inaccurate claims do more damage
when made by multiple sources, or is it the repetition of claims
that matters?
WHAT ROLE DOES THE NUMBER OF SOURCES TAKE IN
THE BELIEVABILITY OF A CLAIM?
On the one hand, it is intuitively appealing that a claim
would be more credible or more damaging when there is con-
sensus among eyewitnesses. Indeed, scientific research tells us
we put more trust in our own memories when other people
who were there remember it the same way,3 and we have more
trust in the details of a crime that multiple eyewitnesses
remember than the details of a crime that only one eyewitness
does.4 And not only is this trust intuitively appealing, but
research supports its validity: When a suspect is picked out of
a lineup by multiple eyewitnesses, their identification is more
likely to be accurate than when that suspect is picked by only
one eyewitness.5 In addition, people’s susceptibility to mis-
leading information changes in response to characteristics of
the person making the claim. For instance, an innocent
bystander is more misleading than the perpetrator of the
crime.6 And even more subtle characteristics of a misleading
eyewitness can influence people’s susceptibility to misinforma-
tion. In one study, eyewitnesses with more powerful and
socially attractive accents were more misleading than eyewit-
nesses with less powerful and socially attractive accents.7
Taken together, these findings suggest that the consensus of
multiple eyewitnesses should be more misleading than the
repeated claims of a single eyewitness.
On the other hand, we know that repeated information can
lead people to make mistakes. Trivia questions that require a
true/false response are more likely to be rated as true when
they are repeated;8 when people repeatedly view pictures of a
place they have never visited, they become more confident that
they have been there before;9 and when one person states an
opinion multiple times, other people are more likely to believe
that opinion is held by others as well.10 Considered together,
these findings suggest that the repetition of inaccurate claims
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WHY DOES REPETITION LEAD PEOPLE TO MAKE THESE
ERRORS? 
One possibility is that when we encounter information we
have seen before, our cognitive system processes that informa-
tion differently. Call it an adaptive shortcut: if you’ve seen x
before and it didn’t attack you the first time, then x is probably
safe enough for your brain to spend less effort making sense of
it. When information is processed with this shortcut, we do not
know it directly, but we often experience a feeling of familiar-
ity: “Ah, I have seen this before.” Cognitive scientists have dis-
covered that we also associate this kind of processing with a
feeling of truth.11 In other words, repeated information tends to
feel more familiar, and more true, than unrepeated information.
IS IT THE REPETITION OF MISLEADING CLAIMS THAT
MATTERS OR THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO MAKE
THEM?
We addressed the effects of repetition and number of eye-
witnesses in two experiments. In our first experiment, we
asked if repeating misleading claims would change the way
people remembered a mock crime, regardless of how many
eyewitnesses repeated those claims. To answer this question,
people took part in an experiment based on a well-known 
eyewitness-memory error called the misinformation effect: They
watched an event, then read a misleading description of the
event, and finally were tested for what they remembered see-
ing.12 Typically, many people report seeing the misleading
details in the event.13
In our study, people first watched a video of an electrician
who stole items while doing repairs at a client’s house. Later,
they read three eyewitness police reports—ostensibly written
over three consecutive days—about the activities of the electri-
cian. Sometimes, all three reports misled people about what
happened in the video; other times only one of the three reports
misled people. To manipulate the source(s) of the reports, we
told half the people that three different eyewitnesses made these
reports; we told the other half that the same eyewitness made
all three reports. For example, people read three eyewitness
reports from Day 1, Day 2, and Day 3: For half of the people,
Eyewitness 5 made the Day 1 report; Eyewitness 9 made the
Day 2 report; and Eyewitness 16 made the Day 3 report. The
other half read the same reports—but all three reports were
attributed to Eyewitness 9. Later, people took a test asking them
about specific details they saw in the mock crime.14
In summary, people read the
reports in one of four conditions: 1)
three eyewitnesses, each making the
same misleading claims across the
three reports; 2) one eyewitness mak-
ing the same claims across the three
reports; 3) three eyewitnesses, only
one of who makes the claims in only
one report; and 4) one eyewitness who
makes the claims in only one report.15
If what matters most is the number
of fellow eyewitnesses giving innacu-
rate, misleading information, then
our results should show that people were the most misled
when they read misinformation three times from three eyewit-
nesses. But if what matters most is the repetition of innacurate
information, then our results should show that people became
more misled when misleading claims were repeated, regardless
of how many eyewitnesses made them. 
Our results suggest that it was repetition that mattered most.
We found three important results. First, and consistent with
research on the misinformation effect, when people read mis-
leading details about the crime they had witnessed, they incor-
porated some of those misleading details into their memory of
the original crime. Second, when the misinformation was
repeated, people became more misled than when the misinfor-
mation was not repeated. And third, people were similarly mis-
led regardless of whether that misinformation was attributed to
a single eyewitness who repeated it or to three independent eye-
witnesses converging on the same misleading claims. In short,
it was the repetition of misleading claims that mattered, not
how many sources the misinformation came from.16
Let’s return to our original example. Based on our results,
we can predict that if John repeatedly tells Ringo the incorrect
color of the robber’s hat, Ringo will more likely be misled than
if John tells him only once. But we can also predict that if that
claim were repeated, it would make little difference if John says
it, or if John, Paul, and George each make the same claim once:
Either way, Ringo would hear it three times and be similarly
misled. But what if Ringo had never seen the crime unfold in
the first place and was trying to determine the truth about
what occurred? How might John’s repeated testimony affect
Ringo’s belief about what really happened? That is the question
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IS IT THE REPETITION OF EYE-
WITNESS CLAIMS OR THE NUM-
BER OF PEOPLE WHO MAKE
THEM THAT AFFECT BELIEF IN
THEIR ACCURACY?
Although our first experiment
showed that repeating misinforma-
tion three times made people less
accurate about what they saw, we
still do not know if repeating inaccu-
rate information would change how
people might judge what happened
when they never saw the crime unfold in the first place—this,
of course, is the situation analogous to being a juror. It may be
that people who did not see the crime would be even more sus-
ceptible to the influence of repetition: After all, they never saw
the crime unfold and must rely entirely on the testimony of an
eyewitness. But on the other hand, people may be more likely
to scrutinize the sources of the claims when judging the accu-
racy of those claims, a behavior that should lead people to be
more confident in claims that reach a consensus among multi-
ple eyewitnesses.
In our second experiment, we wanted to know how the rep-
etition of a claim and the number of sources making that claim
might affect people’s beliefs about the claim’s accuracy. In our
second experiment, we asked people to read the same three
eyewitness reports from our first experiment, but in this case,
people did not watch the video of the original crime. Thus,
they could not know if claims about how the crime unfolded
were true. After they read the eyewitness reports, people
reported their confidence that each claim actually happened in
the original crime.
Once again, our data suggest that it was repetition that mat-
tered most. We found that when claims were repeated, people
became more confident about those claims than when they
were not repeated. In addition, people were similarly confident
about repeated claims regardless of whether they were attrib-
uted to a single eyewitness who repeated it or three indepen-
dent eyewitnesses all converging on the same claims. In short,
it was the repetition of misleading claims that mattered, not
how many sources the misinformation came from.17
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Across two experiments, we asked two questions: First,
does one person repeating inaccurate claims do more damage
to the memories of other eyewitnesses than that same person
making the claims only once? And second, when those inac-
curate claims are repeated, does it matter how many people
make them? The answers are yes and no, respectively. Our
findings converged on the important role of repetition—over
and above the role of how many people make the claims. More
specifically, we found that the misleading claims of a single
eyewitness were more damaging to fellow eyewitnesses’ mem-
ories when that eyewitness repeated them, and that the claims
of a single eyewitness were more credible to people who never
saw the crime when the eyewitness repeated them. Moreover,
a single eyewitness’s repeated claims were as influential as the
claims made by three eyewitnesses. 
Why would one eyewitness repeating a claim become just as
credible as three eyewitnesses? While the adaptive explanation
we presented earlier—that if x has not eaten you before then x
is probably safe—can explain why repeated information feels
more true, it does not explain why people didn’t put even more
stock in claims repeated by multiple eyewitnesses.18 We pro-
pose two possible explanations for this surprising finding.
First, it may be that people did in fact put more stock into the
repeated claims of multiple eyewitnesses,19 but that people also
saw a single eyewitness repeating claims as highly consistent.
Indeed, consistency is one attribute that makes people appear
more credible, and thus more accurate.20 In other words, one
eyewitness repeating a claim may make the claim more credi-
ble for a different reason than three eyewitnesses each stating
the same claim once does. On the other hand it may be that
people failed to attend to the source of the repeated claims
when judging their accuracy. Indeed, the likely explanation of
why repeated misinformation misleads subjects more than
unrepeated misinformation is that subjects’ increased feelings
of familiarity are not accompanied by increases in their ability
to monitor the source of that familiarity.21 Although both of
these mechanisms will produce the patterns we found here,
they provide different pathways to finding a way to reduce the
effects of repetition. As such, future research will need to dis-
entangle the effects of these mechanisms.
Of course, in the real world, multiple eyewitnesses may
stand out in a variety of ways that our written reports did not.
In our study the distinction between a single eyewitness and
multiple eyewitnesses was controlled so that they varied on
identification number only. In court, these eyewitnesses would
vary in superficial (accent, gender, etc.) and important (rela-
tionship to the suspect, motive, etc.) ways—distinctions that
jurors might use to determine the credibility of their claims.
But would these distinctions actually help to reduce the dele-
terious effects of repetition? That question is still one to be
answered by additional experimentation.
In the meantime, the problems with inaccurate eyewitnesses
during a trial are unquestionable.22 Indeed, looking back at the
289 wrongfully convicted people freed by The Innocence
Project to date shows that in more than 75% of cases, eyewit-
ness testimony played a role in their wrongful convictions.23
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claims can lead jurors and other eyewitnesses to put more faith
in those claims than they should—calling on us to be wary
about the power of a single, repeated voice.
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